Before going along with this crude comparison, we must decide how viable this image of a ticking nuclear nightmare is. First, let us look briefly into the main actors:Pakistani Taliban
While the Taliban have originally appeared and developed in Afghanistan, as an offshoot of extreme Daobandi sect (talib means student), the Pakistani Taliban are an interesting mix between some Afghani Taliban which found safe heaven in the Pakistan tribal areas around the mutual borders, and original Pakistani followers. Their leader is Baitullah Mehsud, a Pashtun from the Shabikhel sub-tribe of the Mehsud tribe, in his late 30s, who just like his spiritual mentor Mullah Omar, the ousted leader of the Afghani Taliban, is very camera shy.
[caption id="attachment_141" align="alignleft" width="227" caption="Rare picture of Baitullh Mehsud"]
[/caption]Mehsud is said to have abandoned his education in local madrassas when he was still a teenager and joined the mujahideen to fight the Soviets. His unfinished education prevents him from becoming a mullah, like his spiritual leader, but he publicly calls himself emir which is the equivalent of commander or a leader.
In late December 2007 Baitullah became the head of the newly created Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a loose alliance of about 40 militant organizations from FATA and NWFP. His leadership, however, was short lived as according to The Asia Times newspaper he was allegedly sacked from the position by Mullah Omar. The Taliban alliance grew strong especially in the past year, with Baitullah claiming credit for orchestrating some of the boldest attacks in recent times in Pakistan, including the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, the former prime minister and wife of the current president of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari. Baitullah Mehsud is also believed to have wide connections outside Pakistan. For a long time he was aligned with Mullah Omar, the leader of the Afghani Taliban, and it is believed to have established close relationship with militants from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), who were chased away from the South Waziristan's area of Wana by the local militant leader Maulvi Nazeer. There are also wide speculations about Baitullah's relationship with Arab militants, especially those affiliated with al-Qaeda. Albeit these are unconfirmed, the mere fact that one of the top al-Qaeda commanders, Abu Laith al-Libi a jihadist from Libyan origin as his name suggests, was allegedly killed by US drone bombs on his way to a meeting with Baitullah is indicative of the possible connection and cooperation between the Pakistani Taliban and al-Qaeda.
[caption id="attachment_142" align="alignright" width="150" caption="The killed al-Qaeda commander Abu Laith al-Libi"]
[/caption]Pakistani Army
There is much to be written about the Pakistani military, with their role in governing intermittently the country for the past fifty years. After the notorious Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), the Pakistani army is the second most obscured and unpredictable, highly autonomous agency of governance in the state of Pakistan. The army is 650,000 strong, which makes it the seventh biggest army in the world. It has full command of air force, naval force, and regular ground force. Despite the large speculations about existing sympathies among the army officers towards the Pakistani Taliban and their ideology, in reality the Pakistani army is as ethnically diverse as the population at large.
In fact, Pakistan is so ethnically divided that it is at times hard to be reconciled as one single country, with its Punjabis in the east central part, Balochis in south-west part, Sindhs in the south-east, Pashtuns in the north-west, and various smaller groups, such as the Muhajirs, across the country. Created around the ideal of a state for the Muslims feeling oppressed by the Hindu Indians in 1947, the country has struggled to maintain its identity ever since. This became especially obvious after the violent secession of Eastern Pakistan in 1971, becoming what is now Bangladesh. The high officers in the Pakistani army come predominantly from the Punjab province, and although there are some significant cultural differences between eastern and western Punjabis, the former were successfully assimilated and included in a broader ethnic identity by general Zia ul-Haq, who took power in 1977 in the consecutive military coup in the country. Since then the backbone of the Pakistani army is formed almost entirely by Punjabis.Nuclear Weapons
Pakistan's nuclear program was initiated by Zufiqar Ali Bhutto in 1972. Bhutto was then the Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, later becoming President and Prime Minister of Pakistan. In 1977 Bhutto was overthrown from power by general Zia ul Haq, and later hanged. He was the father of the late former Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto. Around 1974 Pakistan tested its first 'nuclear device' and shortly after that the program was headed by Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the so called 'father of Pakistani bomb.' By 1998 Pakistan was able to develop fully operational nuclear bomb and has conducted successfully six tests. It is believed that Pakistan has somewhere between fifty and one hundred nuclear warheads of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and weapon enriched plutonium (WEP). Pakistan has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
The Threat
The biggest worry these days seems to be that if the Taliban continue with their offensive they somehow can get their hands over the nuclear arsenal of the country, and either use it directly against the US and its allies, or pass it to global jihadist organizations. While in Washington the presidents of Af-Pak, as the two countries are now lumped into a single group, were widely interviewed by all prominent networks in the country, from Charlie Rose Show, to MSNBC's Meet the Press. The recurring question by all interviewers was, how secured the Pakistan's nuclear weapons are, and should the US take a temporary custody of them. Last week again some scholars and policy makers made loud public claims from the pages of The Boston Globe, and NPR's On Point and Here and Now. While the danger of nuclear attack, especially by rough forces is real, there are some logical fallacies, and practical issues associated with that.
First, with the practical issues. As mentioned already, the Pakistani army is some 650,000 strong. Even if one third is deployed in the NWFP's area, as Zardari claimed in Meet the Press, this is pretty substantial military force. The Pakistani would prefer to procrastinate for some time because they want to use the delay in tackling the problem with the Taliban as a bargaining chip against the US for more military aid, in the form of crude cash and more sophisticated weapons, fighter jets, etc. Once their bluff is called however, as perhaps it was over the past week in Washington, Pakistani government will have to take up the task to deal with the threat posed to its rule by the Taliban more seriously. So to speak of a possibility that the Taliban take over Pakistan is rather premature and largely hypothetical.
The Pakistani government concluded a deal with Baitullah earlier this year for greater autonomy in the SWAT valley, which not only outraged the international community, but also bolstered the self confidence of the militants and also gave them some additional time to consolidate power. It did so not because it was too weak to crack down on the militants, but because it did not want to engage in further hostilities. However, now, the Pakistani government has no other positive move, but to crack down on the Taliban if it wants to retain some credibility inside Pakistan, and outside. It is ironic that the US' influence in Pakistani domestic politics has been enhanced rather than weakened by such event as the return of the allegedly anti-US, pro-Islamist former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. While his reputation for pro-nationalistic, pro-Islamist, anti-US stance wins him great skepticism among the western policy makers, he willingly or not becomes the perfect vehicle for calling Zardari's bluffs. This is approach the Bush administration had thought about only very late in its second term, when the situation in Afghanistan deteriorated badly, and Musharaf's hypocrite face was revealed even to his staunch supporters in Washington. Taking steps in cooperation with and support for Sharif by the Obama administration, as reported recently by the New York Times, puts additional pressure on the current Pakistani government to act more decisively against the growing threat from the Taliban. In short, the Pakistani government has the military capability both, to guard its nuclear weapons, and to defeat the Taliban, only if it has the will to do so. And when the will is missing, the US has enough options to put extra pressure on Zardari. This is much more preferable option for the US, than to get involved in messy transportation and custody over the Pakistani nuclear arsenal, which among other things is an option that is practically and logistically not quite feasible either. Until recently, the Pakistani government has been rather reluctant to engage the Taliban in an all out confrontation mainly because of fears not to alienate the local population. It preferred instead to let the US play the bad cop role by not actively opposing the use of drones, which the CIA claims are effective, but also produce a lot of 'collateral damage,' that is they kill many (allegedly disproportionally more) civilians along with the militants they target. By publicly condemning, but privately remaining passive to the daily raids of the drones deep into Pakistan's territory, the Zardari government lets the US pick up the blame and anger of the local population. A quick sidenote is necessary here: this US policy could badly backfire not only towards the US presence in the region, but also against the central govenrment, as the clear messages from the continuing incursions are, a) US are killers, invaders, etc. with no regard to the value of the loss of innocent human life, while the Pakistani governemnt is by association accopmlice, because it is US' allie, and b) the Pakistani government is weak, or hesitant, or both to tackle the problem itself. The result is, howerever, the same - emboldent militants, growing grievences and anger, and more fresh recruits.
Second, some analysts expressed fears that elements in the Pakistani army sympathetic to the Taliban and their causes could potentially 'leak' nuclear material that could then be transferred to jihadists, such as al-Qaeda. This argument supposes a couple of factors. First, that these secret 'sympathizers' of the Taliban inside the army occupy high enough positions so that they can have both knowledge and unrestricted access to the nuclear material. Then that they not only want to steal and smullge nuclear materials to the terrorists, but that they can actually organize the transportation of that material and transfer without being noticed. I, for one, am extremely puzzled and interested how exactly this could be done. Logistically such a clandestine transfer is a 'mission impossible.' Finally, the majority of the nuclear weapons are actually not stored at one location, but are dispersed in various locations with limited knowledge by the high filed officers of the actual locations of all parts. This is specifically done so that no accident, or theft, can occur. Stephen Younger, former head of nuclear weapons research and development at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, notes in his recent book, "The Bomb: A New History," claims that there are numerous safeguards, which if in place – and Pakistan is claiming to have put them in – even the engineers and technicians which have put together the bombs, cannot set them off on their own. This is done so precisely in attempt to avoid the nighmare possibility of nuclear holocost due to some sort of accident.
Third, the technological sophistication aside, many radical Islamists, the Taliban among them, are largely reluctant to consider the use of nuclear weapons as a legitimate form of conduct of war. There are various fatwas produced not only by moderate but also by extremist religious leaders, which prohibit the use of WMD as unreligious. While some sources have suggested that in the late 1990s bin Laden has inquired about and perhaps even toyed with the idea of acquiring some form of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons (CBRN), these claims are a) largely unconfirmed, and b) their realization not quite feasible. Consider this example: after spending many millions, the Japanese fanatic Shoko Asahara failed to inflict the Armageddon he was hoping for by releasing the poisonous gas sarin in the Tokyo subway in 1995; spreading biological agents, such as antrax, is also quite difficult and it is largely agreed that a possible attack would not be able to cover a large area, and the chemical agents are suffering from precisely the same problem as the other WMDs – you can never predict the direction of the wind, nor can you maintain the consistency of the released agent out in the open such as to be lethal for more than a few seconds. Nuclear weapons can only be used by extremists in the form of dirty bombs, which have exactly the same shortfalls as the other agents. Not to mention that they are highly contagious and difficult to operate with.
To sum up, the threat to US from the Pakistan nuclear arsenal falling in the wrong hands is almost non-existent. In addition, the Taliban are so unpredictable that even the neighboring militant groups in South Waziristan should fear more than we do from the Mehsud's formation gaining any more prominence. Thus, we could expect they to be among the first to try to prevent the Taliban from potentially gaining control over weapons which will fundamentally change the local balance of power. Further, the Pakistani military is still strong enough to deal with this problem on its own, and if the destiny of the Pakistani nukes is at stake, I have no doubts that the notorious reluctance of the army to engage directly with the Taliban in a more confrontational way will quickly disappear. Further, the technological level of expertise, unrestricted access, and ability to circumvent the safeguards are enormously difficult, even for insiders, to overcome. The Taliban, let us not forget, are not 'insiders' by any standard. Finally, there are practical problems with any nightmare scenarios for successful dissemination of such weapons which brings the possibility for use of CBRNs against anyone almost to impossibility. And on the top of all that we have the reluctance of religious extremists to engage in dealing with CBRNs in a first place, which brings the danger from the media and policy marriage of Pakistani Taliban and nuclear arsenal almost to non-existing. Somehow, we tend to hear two concepts placed in adjacent sentences, and link them together into a full story of fear and horror. The TV images of Jack Bauer, the rough anti-terrorist US agent, who runs from target to target under the ticking of ever growing terrorist plot, is not realistic and we should not allow the virtual reality of TV shows govern our foreing considerations and policies. That is not to say that either the danger of the Taliban to Pakistan's stability, or of the nuclear proliferation in the region, and in the world as a whole, are to be undermined. On a separate basis both have enormous meaning and pose serious danger. The fallacy begins when we put them together. Deal?
No comments:
Post a Comment